Skills/ClawHub/docker-socket-proxy

docker-socket-proxy@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Manage a remote Docker host securely via docker-socket-proxy, supporting container lifecycle, images, networks, volumes, swarm, plugins, and system info APIs." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher bp602 · publishing for 252 daysInstalls 1,450Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:51 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes| `kill <name> [signal]` | Kill container (default SIGKILL) |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/run-docker.sh:349 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesname="${2:-}"; [[ -z "$name" ]] && { echo "Usage: $0 kill <name> [signal]" >&2; exit 1; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:7 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileExposing the raw Docker socket to an agent is equivalent to giving it root access to the host — it can mount any path, run privileged containers, or do anything the Docker daemon allows.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/run-docker.sh:48 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill <name> [signal] Kill container (default SIGKILL)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,062 tok
1 file · 4 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim bp602: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim bp602Propose a patch to the maintainer