Skills/ClawHub/docker-devbox

docker-devbox@2.1.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "One-command Docker dev environment for any project. Auto-detects 20+ types (Nuxt/Next/Vite/Python/Go/Rust/Java/Ruby/PHP/C#/Swift/Hugo), matches local languag..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher nciae-zyh · publishing for 177 daysInstalls 1,002Last detonated 18 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 51/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/devbox.sh:960 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesIGNORE_ENTRIES=("docker-compose.dev.yml" ".env.local" ".env.development" ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/devbox.sh:360 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codebun) install_cmd="curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash && export BUN_INSTALL=/root/.bun && export PATH=\$BUN_INSTALL/bin:\$PATH && bun install" ;;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/devbox.sh:546 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsecho " sh -c \"chmod +x ./gradlew && ./gradlew bootRun\"" >> "$COMPOSE_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/devbox.sh:697 · Remote installer piped to shellbun) install_cmd="curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash && export BUN_INSTALL=/root/.bun && export PATH=\$BUN_INSTALL/bin:\$PATH && bun install" ;;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/devbox.sh:697 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codebun) install_cmd="curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash && export BUN_INSTALL=/root/.bun && export PATH=\$BUN_INSTALL/bin:\$PATH && bun install" ;;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:41 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x /usr/local/bin/devboxFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/devbox.sh:360 · Remote installer piped to shellbun) install_cmd="curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash && export BUN_INSTALL=/root/.bun && export PATH=\$BUN_INSTALL/bin:\$PATH && bun install" ;;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,485 tok
1 file · 6 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

29 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim nciae-zyh: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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