Skills/ClawHub/dcl-secret-leak-detector

dcl-secret-leak-detector@1.0.2

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Scan AI agent outputs, tool results, and pipeline data for exposed secrets and credentials — API keys, tokens, private keys, database URLs, .env values — before they reach users, logs, or downstream systems. Runs as a free instruction-only checklist, or as a real, paid regex scan via the live DCL..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher daririnch · publishing for 110 daysInstalls 1,262Last detonated 4d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Prompt injection; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:56 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files| `env_assignment` | `.env`-style lines where the variable name matches known secret patterns |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:279 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference- `dcl-prompt-firewall` — Input-layer injection and jailbreak detectionFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesand credentials — API keys, tokens, private keys, database URLs, .env valuesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:280 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference- `dcl-policy-enforcer` — Policy and jailbreak detection for AI outputsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:236 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceDCL Policy Enforcer ← policy & jailbreak checkFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,596 tok
1 file · 2 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim daririnch: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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