dcl-prompt-firewall@1.0.3
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Use this skill to run a real, paid input-layer screen for prompt injection, jailbreak, role-switch, and instruction-override attempts via the live DCL Trust Oracle MCP server — before untrusted input ever reaches the model. Every paid call is metered and settled on-chain via the x402 protocol" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompt injection; Prompt injection; Prompt injection. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
| `dcl_evaluate_jailbreak` | **$0.02** | Instruction-override / jailbreak / injection detection |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.- Your pipeline is exposed to **jailbreak, role-switch, or instruction-override** attemptsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.jailbreak, role-switch, and instruction-override attempts via the live DCLFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.…longside DCL Policy Enforcer and DCL Sentinel Trace. tags: [prompt-injection, jailbreak-detection, input-validation, pre-llm, firewall, instruction-override, token-smu…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.content — for injection, jailbreak, and instruction-override patterns *before* it reaches theFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.DCL Prompt Firewall screens untrusted input for prompt injection, jailbreak, role-switch, and instruction-override attempts before the input reaches a model.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim daririnch: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.