cue-cn-inquiry-letter-reply@0.1.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "A股监管问询函／关注函逐条拆解核对：输入一份问询函，拆成「问题 → 要求提供的材料 → 回复要点 → 回复文件」四栏，每栏挂原句与锚，每个问题都对到它的答复；没答的、没取到的显式点名，中介机构那几份没搜到会提示可能漏取。只做核对与拆条，不代拟答复、不出结论、不代公司表态。Do NOT use for: 帮我写回复（代拟不在本件范围）、审核能否通过（判断位一律 [待人工]）、公告事件速读卡（event-brief-cn）、尽调清单（dd-checklist）。Triggers: 问询函 / 关注函 / 逐条答复 / 监管问询拆解" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
r = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-B", str(CHECK), "--demo"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-B"] + [str(a) for a in args],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.