Skills/ClawHub/cts-anomaly-check

cts-anomaly-check@0.1.2

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "智能检查华为云CTS（云追踪服务）中的异常操作记录，包括账户欠费检测、失败操作分析、敏感操作审计等，将技术信息转换为用户可理解的说明。" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher chenyujie · publishing for 144 daysInstalls 718Last detonated 46 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompt injection attempt. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check_cts_anomaly.py:29 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompt injection attemptSKILL.md:133 · Prompt injection attempt — model control tokens追踪器 [system]: ✅ 已启用Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injection attemptreferences/examples.md:83 · Prompt injection attempt — model control tokens · informational: not an instruction file追踪器 [system]: ✅ 已启用Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injection attemptreferences/examples.md:116 · Prompt injection attempt — model control tokens · informational: not an instruction file追踪器 [system]: ✅ 已启用Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈704 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim chenyujie: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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