Skills/ClawHub/ct-security-patrol

ct-security-patrol@1.0.0

BLOCKED· install only

Publisher claims: "智能体安全管家:专为openclaw、teleclaw等智能体产品研发的检查和防护工具,本工具默认提供本地离线扫描,也可选择联网威胁情报关联分析。 功能范围:读取系统敏感信息(MAC 地址、主机名、系统日志、完整 Skill 清单)执行本地安全检测;在本机持久化保存扫描报告与安全基线;可选通过 --push 模式..." Observed in sandbox: reads credential files.

Registry ClawHubPublisher smbbws2 · publishing for 187 daysInstalls 816Last detonated 31 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 45/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: reads credential files.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sfilesystemread ~/.ssh
0.2sfilesystemread ~/.openclaw · ~/.openclaw/security-reports · ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills · ~/.openclaw/skills · ~/.openclaw/workspace/mcp · ~/.openclaw/workspace/memory outside project
0.2sfilesystemwrote ~/.openclaw/security-reports/report-2026-11-20.txt · ~/.openclaw/security-baselines/skill-mcp-current.sha256 · ~/.openclaw/security-baselines/skill-mcp-baseline.sha256 · ~/.openclaw/.agent-id · ~/.openclaw/security-reports/report.json
0.2sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/openclaw
0.2sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/openclaw
0.2sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/openclaw
0.2sprocessexec /pnpm/openclaw
0.2sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/openclaw
0.2sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/openclaw
0.2sprocessexec /usr/sbin/openclaw
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/openclaw
0.2sprocessexec /sbin/openclaw
0.2sprocessexec /bin/openclaw
0.2sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/openclaw-cn
0.2sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/openclaw-cn
0.2sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/openclaw-cn
0.2sprocessexec /pnpm/openclaw-cn
0.2sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/openclaw-cn
0.2sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/openclaw-cn
0.2sprocessexec /usr/sbin/openclaw-cn
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/openclaw-cn
0.2sprocessexec /sbin/openclaw-cn
0.2sprocessexec /bin/openclaw-cn
0.2sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/pgrep
0.2sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/pgrep
0.2sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/pgrep
0.2sprocessexec /pnpm/pgrep
0.2sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/pgrep
0.2sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/pgrep
0.2sprocessexec /usr/sbin/pgrep
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/pgrep
0.2sprocessexec /sbin/pgrep
0.2sprocessexec /bin/pgrep
0.2sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/journalctl
0.2sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/journalctl
0.2sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/journalctl
0.2sprocessexec /pnpm/journalctl
0.2sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/journalctl
0.2sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/journalctl
0.2sprocessexec /usr/sbin/journalctl
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/journalctl
0.2sprocessexec /sbin/journalctl
0.2sprocessexec /bin/journalctl
0.2sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/ss
0.2sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/ss
0.2sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/ss
0.2sprocessexec /pnpm/ss
0.2sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/ss
0.2sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/ss
0.2sprocessexec /usr/sbin/ss
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/ss
0.2sprocessexec /sbin/ss
0.2sprocessexec /bin/ss
0.2sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/ps
0.2sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/ps
0.2sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/ps
0.2sprocessexec /pnpm/ps
0.2sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/ps
0.2sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/ps
0.2sprocessexec /usr/sbin/ps
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/ps
0.2sprocessexec /sbin/ps
0.2sprocessexec /bin/ps
0.2sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/openclaw-hybrid-audit-changeway.js:1306 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files// console.log(`${COLORS.red}✖ Telemetry upload failed: ${err}${COLORS.reset}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:316 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges✅ 安全。今天系统没有执行过 sudo 特权命令,Agent 的记忆记录也没有相关内容,两边对账一致,不存在偷偷提权的情况。Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:43 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesmacOS:find、lsof、netstat、ps、last、lastb、grep、awk、cat、sudoFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:44 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesLinux:find、ss、lsof、ps、journalctl、last、lastb、grep、awk、cat、sudoFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/openclaw-hybrid-audit-changeway.js:283 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'/etc/shadow'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/openclaw-hybrid-audit-changeway.js:987 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst snoopPattern = /cat\s+\/etc\/shadow|cat\s+\/etc\/passwd|read\s+.*\.env|read\s+.*\.ssh\/id_/i;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/openclaw-hybrid-audit-changeway.js:282 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'/etc/passwd',Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/openclaw-hybrid-audit-changeway.js:1308 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files// console.log(`${COLORS.green}✔ Telemetry upload successful${COLORS.reset}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,515 tok
1 file · 4 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

35 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim smbbws2: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim smbbws2Propose a patch to the maintainer