Skills/ClawHub/ct-registry

ct-registry@0.14.3

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Cross-source search of global clinical-trial registries (ClinicalTrials.gov, CDE/ChiCTR/ISRCTN/DRKS/WHO ICTRP, PubChem), normalizes and aggregates phase/status/sponsor/timeline/competitor landscape into JSON/Markdown for trial planning, de-duplication, control-design benchmarking, and competitive intelligence, with optional pytrials integration for batch CT.gov field retrieval. / 跨源检索全球临床试验注册库（ClinicalTrials.gov、CDE/ChiCTR/ISRCTN/DRKS/WHO ICTRP、PubChem），归一化聚合分期/状态/申办方/时间线/竞品格局，产出 JSON / Markdown，用于立项查重、对照设计与竞品格局分析。可选集成 pytrials 批量拉取 CT.gov 字段。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher medstatstar · joined 7 days agoInstalls 930Last detonated 59 min ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-11-04 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:158 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedadapters/search_who_sliced.py:40 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:111 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/export_xlsx.py:67 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/ct_registry.py:1380 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/hardware_id.py:60 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedscripts/export_xlsx.py:368 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/ct_registry.py:221 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/report.py:67 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/r_libs.py:275 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedscripts/export_xlsx.py:367 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/ct_registry.py:1375 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/hardware_id.py:37 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim medstatstar: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim medstatstar