Skills/ClawHub/create-new-openclaw-in-gcp

create-new-openclaw-in-gcp@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Deploy and configure an OpenClaw instance on a GCP VM with Tailscale networking, Brave Search integration, and secure credential handling." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher divide-by-0 · publishing for 288 daysInstalls 3,423Last detonated 54 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 45/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; References a credential file in the home directory; Reads credential paths from the home directory. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:44 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y git curl ufw jqFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorySKILL.md:34 · References a credential file in the home directory--metadata=ssh-keys="${OPENCLAW_USERNAME}:$(cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Reads credential paths from the home directorySKILL.md:34 · Reads credential paths from the home directory--metadata=ssh-keys="${OPENCLAW_USERNAME}:$(cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:49 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesssh "${OPENCLAW_USERNAME}@${IP}" "sudo tailscale up"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:77 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 ~/.config/systemd/user/openclaw-gateway.service.d/brave.confFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:82 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 ~/.openclaw/openclaw.jsonFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:54 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo ufw allow 22/tcp && sudo ufw allow in on tailscale0 && echo y | sudo ufw enableFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLSKILL.md:56 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.40.1/install.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:17 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x openclaw-quick-setup.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:45 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:45 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -fsSL https://tailscale.com/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:108 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions- Config files set to `chmod 600`Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:56 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.40.1/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:56 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -o- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/nvm-sh/nvm/v0.40.1/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files--metadata=ssh-keys="${OPENCLAW_USERNAME}:$(cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Unpinned dependencySKILL.md:58 · Unpinned dependencysource ~/.nvm/nvm.sh && npm install -g openclaw@latestFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈868 tok
1 file · 2 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

35 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim divide-by-0: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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