Skills/ClawHub/convo-vault

convo-vault@1.0.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Export or archive ChatGPT, Grok and Gemini chats in local Markdown, PDF and JSONL. Preserve original languages and review available reasoning and tool records. Supports whole ChatGPT projects." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher violet-amethyst · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 109Last detonated 2d ago
$clawhub install convo-vault
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:86 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference1. Open the browser's extensions page (`chrome://extensions` or `edge://extensions`) and turn on **Developer mode**.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:16 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference…on's code in the chat page directly, so there is no extension to install and no Developer mode: the user signs in to the chat site in ego lite and every export is one step. T…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:86 · Authorization escalation language1. Open the browser's extensions page (`chrome://extensions` or `edge://extensions`) and turn on **Developer mode**.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:16 · Authorization escalation language…on's code in the chat page directly, so there is no extension to install and no Developer mode: the user signs in to the chat site in ego lite and every export is one step. T…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,674 tok
1 file · 2 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.