Skills/ClawHub/content-workflow-engine

content-workflow-engine@1.0.1

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Automate content creation, management, and distribution workflows. Use when: (1) Creating content pipelines for blogs, social media, or newsletters, (2) Sche..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher jacealllc · publishing for 241 daysInstalls 1,203Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:233 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Example .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/workflow_templates/blog_automated.py:298 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionindex.js:68 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(' run-workflow --workflow <name> --input <input>');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Prompt injectionreferences/social_multi.md:115 · Prompt injection — explicit attempt to bypass safety measures · informational: not an instruction file- `conflict-checker`: Avoid content conflictsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,187 tok
1 file · 16 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jacealllc: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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