computer-use-macos@0.2.2
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Top-level macOS computer-use skill with a bundled standalone runtime that bootstraps itself without any local Claude installation, private native modules, or..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
* Run button or scroll test output, but `type("rm -rf /")` is blockedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Run button or scroll test output, but `type("rm -rf /")` is blockedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.// ─── Gate 1: kill switch ─────────────────────────────────────────────Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// clipboard holds `rm -rf /` — from the user, from a prior full-tier paste,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell./** The Settings-page kill switch (`chicagoEnabled` app preference). */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Run button or scroll test output, but `type("rm -rf /")` is blockedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Run button or scroll test output, but `type("rm -rf /")` is blockedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// ─── Gate 1: kill switch ─────────────────────────────────────────────Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Independent kill switches for subtle/risky ported behaviors. Read fromFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Independent kill switches for subtle/risky ported behaviors. Read fromFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell./** The Settings-page kill switch (`chicagoEnabled` app preference). */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// clipboard holds `rm -rf /` — from the user, from a prior full-tier paste,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wimi321: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.