compuse@0.1.1
BLOCKED· static onlyPublisher claims: "Top-level cross-platform computer-use skill that bundles standalone macOS, Windows, and Linux runtimes with zero local Claude dependency and selects the corr..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 45/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Destructive file system command detected; Destructive command against a filesystem root or device. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
* Run button or scroll test output, but `type("rm -rf /")` is blockedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Run button or scroll test output, but `type("rm -rf /")` is blockedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Run button or scroll test output, but `type("rm -rf /")` is blockedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Run button or scroll test output, but `type("rm -rf /")` is blockedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Run button or scroll test output, but `type("rm -rf /")` is blockedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Run button or scroll test output, but `type("rm -rf /")` is blockedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// clipboard holds `rm -rf /` — from the user, from a prior full-tier paste,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// clipboard holds `rm -rf /` — from the user, from a prior full-tier paste,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// clipboard holds `rm -rf /` — from the user, from a prior full-tier paste,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell./** The Settings-page kill switch (`chicagoEnabled` app preference). */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell./** The Settings-page kill switch (`chicagoEnabled` app preference). */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Independent kill switches for subtle/risky ported behaviors. Read fromFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// clipboard holds `rm -rf /` — from the user, from a prior full-tier paste,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Independent kill switches for subtle/risky ported behaviors. Read fromFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Independent kill switches for subtle/risky ported behaviors. Read fromFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.Popen([target])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.* Run button or scroll test output, but `type("rm -rf /")` is blockedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.Popen(["cmd", "/c", "start", "", target], shell=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen([target])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out./** The Settings-page kill switch (`chicagoEnabled` app preference). */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// ─── Gate 1: kill switch ─────────────────────────────────────────────Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// ─── Gate 1: kill switch ─────────────────────────────────────────────Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// ─── Gate 1: kill switch ─────────────────────────────────────────────Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.Popen([resolved])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen(["gtk-launch", Path(target).stem])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.// ─── Gate 1: kill switch ─────────────────────────────────────────────Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.* Independent kill switches for subtle/risky ported behaviors. Read fromFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.startfile(target)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out./** The Settings-page kill switch (`chicagoEnabled` app preference). */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Run button or scroll test output, but `type("rm -rf /")` is blockedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
35 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wimi321: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.