Skills/ClawHub/codexbox

codexbox@0.7.8

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Install, configure, or run Codex through the codexbox wrapper, or connect to its HTTP, MCP, Telegram, or cron surfaces." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher psyb0t · publishing for 90 daysInstalls 2,283Last detonated 4d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:300 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…gets a history dir at `<root>/history/<workspace>/<timestamp>-<job>/` with `meta.json`, `stdout.log`, `stderr.log`, `result.txt` (plus `telegram.json` when telegram is also configured, and the next run's prompt gets a "prior run" hint auto…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:107 · Destructive file system command detecteddocker run --rm \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedSKILL.md:7 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content{ "openclaw": { "emoji": "🧑‍💻", "primaryEnv": "CODEXBOX_URL", "requires": { "bins": ["docker", "curl"] } } }Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,877 tok
1 file · 3 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim psyb0t: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim psyb0tPropose a patch to the maintainer