codecast@4.1.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Stream coding agent sessions (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, etc.) to a Discord channel in real-time via webhook. Use when invoking coding agents and wantin..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Discord webhook URL. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
kill "$RELAY_PID" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.kill "$AGENT_PID" 2>/dev/null; sleep 1; kill -9 "$AGENT_PID" 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.!kill Kill a session: !kill <PID>Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.fail "$(basename "$script") is not executable — run: chmod +x $script"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process kill sessionId:<id> # Stop sessionFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod +x "$CMD_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.if kill -0 "$AGENT_PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return False, f"Failed to kill {pid}: {e}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.while kill -0 "$RELAY_PID" 2>/dev/null; doFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# --- Command: !kill <PID> ---Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.reply(channel_id, "Usage: `!kill <PID>`")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if kill -0 "$PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.[ -z "$WEBHOOK_URL" ] && { echo "❌ Error: .webhook-url not found in $SCRIPT_DIR" >&2; echo " Create it: echo 'https://discord.com/api/webhooks/ID/TOKEN' > $SCRIPT_DIR/.webhook-url" >&2; exit 1; }Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, timeout=10, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.| `-p <prompt>` | Custom review prompt | Standard code review |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim allanjeng: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Discord webhook URL≈ +4 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.