Skills/ClawHub/code-to-video-previz

code-to-video-previz@1.0.2

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Prototype a video in code with an agent. Decides if a shot needs a 3D prototype at all and which tool fits (Three.js, Blender, a phone act-out, storyboards, Remotion, Cinema 4D, Unreal), stages geometry, people, camera and light in real metres, copies a reference video shot by shot with a solved 3D camera, stages a shot from a painting or still, invents one when there is no reference, checks everything with numbers and frames, and writes the handoff to Seedance or other video models. Same scene file renders in Three.js and headless Blender. Use for "previz", "blockout", "3D animatic", "three.js or blender", "prototype this video", "copy this shot", "recreate this video in 3D", "stage this painting", "camera blocking with Claude or Codex", "code to video", "rank takes", "LLM judge", or when generated shots keep drifting. Not for a full multi-shot three.js film with a review UI (threejs-animatic, varg-previz), prompting a shot with no prototype (varg-video-prompting) or the full animation pass (video-animate)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher vargai · joined 9 days agoInstalls 10Last detonated 49 min ago

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph); HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; Outbound HTTP to raw IP address. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressscripts/cdp.ts:40 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/measure_shot.py:45 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/shots.py:17 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/compare.py:21 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph)references/sources.md:99 · Latin word with Cyrillic or Greek look-alike letters (homoglyph)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:1 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/solved_to_staging.py:14 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressscripts/cdp.ts:40 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/compare.py:31 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/grid.py:26 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,414 tok
1 file · 27 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim vargai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. URL using raw IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim vargaiPropose a patch to the maintainer