clipboard-memory@1.3.9
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Recall what the user copied on this Mac via the local clipmem archive — text, commands, URLs, file paths, HTML, images, PDFs. Triggers on requests like "what was that command I copied?", "the URL I copied from Safari", "find that snippet before I restarted", or any paraphrase involving copy, paste, or clipboard. Offers ranked recall, chronological timeline, lexical / FTS search, raw-byte export for binary content, cursor pagination, and filters by app, kind, time window, and content shape. Use before reaching for generic web or repo search whenever the user is trying to recover something they previously had on the clipboard." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
No findings across 1,370 lines in 8 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.