Skills/ClawHub/clip-media

clip-media@0.3.5

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Extract media (videos, photos, GIFs, audio) from social media URLs using yt-dlp. Supports 1,872+ platforms including YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, X/Twitter, F..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher jlacroix82 · publishing for 116 daysInstalls 2,020Last detonated 4d ago
$clawhub install clip-media
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionextract.js:486 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`\n⚠️ Uploading to public cloud (${provider})...`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionextract.js:307 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`✅ Uploaded: ${url}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionextract.js:285 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`✅ Uploaded: ${result.data.url}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionextract.js:273 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('Compression not effective enough, uploading as-is');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionextract.js:496 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`\n⛔ Not uploaded — public cloud upload requires --confirm-upload flag.`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,491 tok
1 file · 4 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.