Skills/ClawHub/clink-integ-skills

clink-integ-skills@2.0.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Design, scaffold, validate, and review ClinkBill/Clink payment integrations, including clink-integ-cli usage, local clink login Secret Key bootstrap, browserless manual Secret Key setup, webhook endpoint automation, product/price/subscription catalog import, checkout and subscription APIs, webhook s" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher clink · publishing for 135 daysInstalls 659Last detonated 2d ago
$clawhub install clink-integ-skills
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Authorization escalation languagereferences/review-checklist.md:89 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- does it explain team access through `Settings > Users` and avoid giving Developer access to roles that docs say do not have itFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionlib/skill-runtime.mjs:721 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesbuildArtifact("payment_handoff_contract", "templates/agent-handoff-contract.json", "Structured merchant confirmation input with server, confirm_tool, confirm_args, and payment_handoff"),Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:187 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…n` only in a controlled local secret-write step; write the value to an ignored `.env`, platform Secret, or secret manager, and never echo it in final output - for b…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvendor/clink-integ-cli/clink-integ-cli.js:7587 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesrelativePath: ".env.example",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvendor/clink-integ-cli/clink-integ-cli.js:7626 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Copy `.env.example` to your local environment file and fill in:",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈5,043 tok
1 file · 78 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.