Skills/ClawHub/clawtraces

clawtraces@2.0.8

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "采集并提交本地 OpenClaw 对话记录到数据平台。当用户说「采集数据」「提交数据」「提交对话」「提交记录」「提交日志」「扫描对话」「扫描日志」「看看有哪些对话可以提交」「帮我提交对话记录」「查看提交记录」「提交了多少条」「clawtraces」「claw」，或表达想要扫描、采集、提交、查看本地对话记录的意图时..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher miracle · publishing for 206 daysInstalls 2,059Last detonated 1 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 58/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/lib/core/auth.py:91 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Load key=value pairs from the skill .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:471 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files├── .env # API key + server URLFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/lib/core/auth.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# OUTPUT: API key stored in .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/lib/core/auth.py:128 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Remove a key from the .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/lib/core/paths.py:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Return path to the .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/lib/core/auth.py:146 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Get server URL from env var, .env file, or default.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/lib/core/auth.py:106 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Save or update a key=value pair in the .env file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/reasoning_stats.py:9 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesReads .openai.json files from output directory and reports reasoning ratio.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/lib/convert/system_prompt_builder.py:51 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"subagents": "List, steer, or kill sub-agent runs for this requester session",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/cli.py:208 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/lib/core/paths.py:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn os.path.join(get_data_dir(), ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/lib/adapters/openclaw/_manifest.py:9 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files``manifest.json`` lives alongside trajectories in ``output_dir`` and tracks:Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,064 tok
1 file · 66 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

22 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim miracle: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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