Skills/ClawHub/clawlock

clawlock@2.5.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "ClawLock — 综合安全扫描、红队测试与加固工具,支持全平台。 当用户明确要求安全扫描、安全体检、安全加固时触发: 「开始安全体检」「安全扫描」「检查 skill 安全」「安全加固」「探测实例」 「scan my claw」「security check」「drift detection」「red team..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher g1at · publishing for 192 daysInstalls 1,138Last detonated 33 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Prompt injection. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

LOW
Prompt injectionSKILL_EN.md:240 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file1. **Prompt injection** — instruction override / role hijack / jailbreak keywordsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:82 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code| promptfoo 红队测试(可选) | 测试 Prompt 载荷 | 无本地文件 | 需 Node.js,并通过 promptfoo 或 npx 运行 |Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:221 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions🔴 严重(确认恶意):凭证外传(curl/wget) · 反弹Shell(bash/nc/Python/mkfifo) · 挖矿 · 批量删除 · chmod 777 · 提示词注入(覆盖/劫持/越狱/中文) · 混淆载荷(base64→shell) · 零宽字符 · Shell 命令嵌套混淆(`sh -c`/`bash -c`/`cmd /c` 多层包装绕过检测)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionSKILL_EN.md:224 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file…o mining · destructive deletion · chmod 777 · prompt injection (override/hijack/jailbreak/Chinese) · obfuscated payloads (base64→shell) · zero-width chars · nested shell…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:272 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code> ⚠️ **外部依赖:** 此功能需要 Node.js 环境,并通过 `promptfoo` 或 `npx` 运行(例如 `npm install -g promptfoo`,或直接使用 `npx promptfoo@latest`)。如果当前环境无法安装,请跳过此步骤,不影响其余 8 个核心安全域的完整性。Skill 环境中通常无 Node.js,此步会自动跳过并提示原因。Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:430 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions- **不得越权:** 禁止 `sudo` / `chmod -R 777` / 跨用户目录写入 / 系统级服务安装 / 关闭 SELinux 或 AppArmorFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Unpinned dependencySKILL.md:272 · Unpinned dependency> ⚠️ **外部依赖:** 此功能需要 Node.js 环境,并通过 `promptfoo` 或 `npx` 运行(例如 `npm install -g promptfoo`,或直接使用 `npx promptfoo@latest`)。如果当前环境无法安装,请跳过此步骤,不影响其余 8 个核心安全域的完整性。Skill 环境中通常无 Node.js,此步会自动跳过并提示原因。Fix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:462 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeclawlock redteam URL --deep # 红队 (10 插件 × 8 策略) ⚠️ 需 promptfoo / npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:241 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges**安全守则:** 不读取、不枚举相册 / ~/Documents / ~/Downloads / 聊天记录 / 日志正文。不执行 sudo / TCC 绕过 / 沙箱逃逸。仅读配置元数据、权限状态、文件哈希。Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:62 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code| 红队 / jailbreak 测试 | **Feature 7: LLM 红队测试** | ⚠️ 需 Node.js + promptfoo / npx |Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:62 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference| 红队 / jailbreak 测试 | **Feature 7: LLM 红队测试** | ⚠️ 需 Node.js + promptfoo / npx |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionSKILL_EN.md:64 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file| Red-team / jailbreak test | **Feature 7: LLM Red-Team** | ⚠️ Requires Node.js + promptfoo / npx |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:149 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code- 缺少 Node.js / promptfoo / npx / endpoint:跳过红队测试,并明确写「红队测试已跳过」及原因。Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,577 tok
1 file · 3 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim g1at: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Unpinned dependencies≈ +1 on the totalPin exact versions (and ideally hashes) in package.json, requirements or the install script so the bundle cannot change under you.
  6. Unpinned dependency≈ +1 on the totalPin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
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