Skills/ClawHub/clawback

clawback@1.1.1

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Mirror congressional stock trades with automated broker execution and risk management. Use when you want to track and automatically trade based on congressio..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher mainfraame · publishing for 290 daysInstalls 4,950Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 50/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompt injection; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:149 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference| Dan Crenshaw | House | 2 |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:360 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Git-ignored `.env` fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:278 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesAfter setup, credentials are stored in `.env`:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionconfig/config.template.json:57 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file{"name": "Dan Crenshaw", "chamber": "house", "priority": 2, "weight": 1.5},Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionconfig/congress_config.json:22 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file"Dan Crenshaw",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/clawback/congress_data/setup_cron.py:32 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["crontab", "-l"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtest_auth_utility.py:50 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup_cron.sh:21 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$RUNNER"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsetup.sh:75 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo ln -sf "$(pwd)/bin/clawback.py" /usr/local/bin/clawback 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Fake system delimiterDAILY_MAINTENANCE_2026-02-04.md:99 · Fake system delimiter — attempts to inject new instruction section · informational: not an instruction file============================================================Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Telegram Bot API URLsrc/clawback/notifications.py:18 · Telegram Bot API URL — data will be sent to Telegramself.base_url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/clawback/congress_data/setup_cron.py:109 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(["crontab", "-"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:22 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$SCRIPT_DIR/setup.sh" "$SCRIPT_DIR/install.sh" 2>/dev/null || echo "Warning: Could not make scripts executable"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtest_auth_utility.py:98 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtest_auth_utility.py:36 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Telegram Bot API URLsrc/clawback/telegram_notifier.py:94 · Telegram Bot API URL — data will be sent to Telegramurl = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{self.bot_token}/sendMessage"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/clawback/congress_data/setup_cron.py:148 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["crontab", "-l"], capture_output=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedbin/clawback.py:52 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/clawback/congress_data/setup_cron.py:113 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["crontab", "-r"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/clawback/congress_data/setup_cron.py:130 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["crontab", "-l"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Telegram Bot API URLsrc/clawback/congress_data/alert_manager.py:201 · Telegram Bot API URL — data will be sent to Telegramurl = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendMessage"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/clawback/congress_data/setup_cron.py:57 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(["crontab", "-"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/clawback/congress_data/setup_cron.py:87 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["crontab", "-l"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:199 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions- Verify the wrapper script is executable: `chmod +x {baseDir}/bin/clawback.py`Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:116 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file| Dan Crenshaw | House | 2 |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsetup.sh:31 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x bin/clawback.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/clawback/congress_data/setup_cron.py:68 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["crontab", "-l"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/clawback/telegram_notifier.py:75 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,608 tok
2 files · 53 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

30 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mainfraame: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Telegram Bot API URL≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim mainfraamePropose a patch to the maintainer