clawback@1.1.1
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Mirror congressional stock trades with automated broker execution and risk management. Use when you want to track and automatically trade based on congressio..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 50/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompt injection; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
| Dan Crenshaw | House | 2 |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.- Git-ignored `.env` fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.After setup, credentials are stored in `.env`:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.{"name": "Dan Crenshaw", "chamber": "house", "priority": 2, "weight": 1.5},Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent."Dan Crenshaw",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.result = subprocess.run(["crontab", "-l"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x "$RUNNER"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.sudo ln -sf "$(pwd)/bin/clawback.py" /usr/local/bin/clawback 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.============================================================Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.self.base_url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.process = subprocess.Popen(["crontab", "-"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod +x "$SCRIPT_DIR/setup.sh" "$SCRIPT_DIR/install.sh" 2>/dev/null || echo "Warning: Could not make scripts executable"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{self.bot_token}/sendMessage"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.subprocess.run(["crontab", "-l"], capture_output=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["crontab", "-r"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(["crontab", "-l"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendMessage"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.process = subprocess.Popen(["crontab", "-"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(["crontab", "-l"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- Verify the wrapper script is executable: `chmod +x {baseDir}/bin/clawback.py`Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.| Dan Crenshaw | House | 2 |Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.chmod +x bin/clawback.pyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.run(["crontab", "-l"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
30 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mainfraame: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Telegram Bot API URL≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.