Skills/ClawHub/claude-connect

claude-connect@1.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Connect Claude to Clawdbot instantly and keep it connected 24/7. Run after setup to link your subscription, then auto-refreshes tokens forever." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher tunaissacoding · publishing for 301 daysInstalls 7,430Last detonated 18 h ago
$clawhub install claude-connect
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.0sprocessexited 1:
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexited 1:
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sfilesystemwrote ~/clawd/logs/claude-oauth-refresh.log
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/tee
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/awk
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/sort
0.1sprocessexited 127:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cut
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/du
0.1sprocessexited 1: ./uninstall.sh: line 24: launchctl: command not found
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocess6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexited 1:

Static findings

LOW
Authorization escalation languageSUMMARY.md:66 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- **Discord:** Developer mode instructionsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtest-detection.sh:77 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsecho "Run: chmod +x $SCRIPT_DIR/detect-notification-config.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandverify-setup.sh:241 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsecho " → Run: chmod +x $SCRIPT_DIR/*.sh"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:178 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "$SCRIPT_DIR"/*.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionSUMMARY.md:66 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file- **Discord:** Developer mode instructionsFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,534 tok
1 file · 20 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.