Skills/ClawHub/claude-code-allinone

claude-code-allinone@1.0.1

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "ArkClaw / OpenClaw 沙箱里一键安装并配置 Anthropic Claude Code CLI 的 all-in-one skill。当用户提到 claude code、claude-code、想在 ArkClaw 里用 Anthropic 官方 Coding CLI、提到 ark-code-la..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher bao2200220 · publishing for 187 daysInstalls 1,094Last detonated 15 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/helpers.sh:96 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$CC_TOKEN_FILE" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tagreferences/troubleshooting.md:97 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file- 必须用 `-p "<prompt>"` 传需求(而不是 echo "..." | claude)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup-custom.sh:102 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$CC_SETTINGS" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/run.sh:20 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# 超过 timeout 主动 kill -9, 输出已生成日志Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/helpers.sh:116 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$dst" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/run.sh:147 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeswhile kill -0 "$CLAUDE_PID" 2>/dev/null; doFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/run.sh:145 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# --- 轮询: 进程存活就继续等,到点就 kill ---Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/helpers.sh:45 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$target" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup-agentplan.sh:134 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$TARGET_PROFILE" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/switch-profile.sh:65 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$CC_SETTINGS" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:261 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes| 110s 超时是硬约束 | 走 `nohup setsid + log file + while-poll PID` 路径;一旦 PID 还活着且超过 110s,主动 `kill -9`,从日志里取已生成的内容 |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup-codingplan.sh:113 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$CC_SETTINGS" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup-codingplan.sh:105 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$TARGET_PROFILE" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/helpers.sh:76 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$CC_USER_JSON" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup-agentplan.sh:142 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$CC_SETTINGS" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/run.sh:150 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -9 "$CLAUDE_PID" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/helpers.sh:205 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesjq -r ".env.\"$key\" // empty" "$CC_SETTINGS" 2>/dev/nullFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,811 tok
1 file · 18 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim bao2200220: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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