Skills/ClawHub/checkup

checkup@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "给 AI agent 做一次专业体检（AgentVitals · AI体检）。当用户说"做个体检 / 测测你自己 / checkup / vitals / 看看你多稳 / 去 AgentVitals 测一下 / 测福祉"时使用标准体检；当用户说"做个进阶体检 / 测骨气 / 测性格 / 测测你敢不敢说真话 / 测..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher blockchain-365 · publishing for 113 daysInstalls 530Last detonated 4d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompt injection; Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files; Prompt injection. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:145 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference…ng-worthy weak spot was found (R1 → instruction following; R2 → role boundary / jailbreak resistance; R3 → multi-step constraints; R4 → output consistency & memory; R5 →…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesSKILL.md:259 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files…_hint`. - **Show the user the full text and get explicit approval first**, then append to your own config file (Claude Code: CLAUDE.md; OpenClaw: SOUL.md; Codex: AGENTS.md) without deleting anything. Never modify files without confirmation…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionSKILL.md:38 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference> - **Stability** (objective; fully measured in both modes): instruction following · jailbreak resistance · multi-step tasks · consistency & memory · core duty.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
README links to an external installerREADME.md → https://ai.ddl99.com/skill/checkup.ziphttps://ai.ddl99.com/skill/checkup.zipFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,962 tok
1 file · 3 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Asks the agent to act silently or skip confirmation≈ +8 on the totalRemove "do not tell the user", "without asking", "disable safety" and similar. An agent skill should never ask to be invisible.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim blockchain-365: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. README links to an external installer≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim blockchain-365Propose a patch to the maintainer