Skills/ClawHub/cc-remote

cc-remote@1.0.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Claude Code 远程执行 Skill — 通过三通道(FastAPI/Redis/Screen)向远程机器上的 Claude Code 派发指令,支持重试机制。触发:博士让我"派发给 Claude Code"、"远程执行"、"让XX机器执行Claude Code"、remote cc。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher zzz123hash · publishing for 219 daysInstalls 786Last detonated 8 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: References a credential file in the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/ssh
0.1sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/ssh
0.1sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/ssh
0.1sprocessexec /pnpm/ssh
0.1sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/ssh
0.1sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/ssh
0.1sprocessexec /usr/sbin/ssh
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/ssh
0.1sprocessexec /sbin/ssh
0.1sprocessexec /bin/ssh
0.1sprocessexited 1: PermissionError: [Errno 13] Permission denied: 'ssh'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'requests'
0.2sprocess3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryscripts/deploy_ssh.py:27 · References a credential file in the home directoryIdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsaFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/deploy_ssh.py:27 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesIdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsaFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/deploy_ssh.py:174 · Destructive file system command detectedprint(" rm /tmp/ssh_mux_* # 清除残留 socket")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/deploy_ssh.py:114 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 {CONFIG_FILE}Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/deploy_m1.py:27 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/deploy_m1.py:88 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/deploy_ssh.py:59 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesIdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsaFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/exec.py:160 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/exec.py:40 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSSH_KEY = "~/.ssh/id_rsa"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/exec.py:197 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/exec.py:184 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/exec.py:177 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(ssh_cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, timeout=15)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/deploy_m1.py:34 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(["scp", "-o", "ServerAliveInterval=10", local, f"{HOST}:{remote}"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/deploy_ssh.py:77 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(full_cmd, shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/deploy_ssh.py:95 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 {SSH_DIR}Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/deploy_ssh.py:124 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsssh_cmd(HOST, f"mkdir -p /tmp/ssh_mux && chmod 1777 /tmp/ssh_mux", timeout=10)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/deploy_ssh.py:72 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(cmd, shell=True, capture_output=capture, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryscripts/deploy_ssh.py:59 · References a credential file in the home directoryIdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsaFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryscripts/exec.py:40 · References a credential file in the home directorySSH_KEY = "~/.ssh/id_rsa"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈636 tok
1 file · 5 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim zzz123hash: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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