Skills/ClawHub/catch-claw

catch-claw@3.5.7

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Search, install, and export agentars from the CatchClaw marketplace. Use when the user wants to find, install, or package agent templates." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher lovelcp · publishing for 244 daysInstalls 1,418Last detonated 25 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsagentar_cli.mjs:311 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst entry = "skills/.credentials";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionagentar_cli.mjs:705 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif (output.stdout) console.log(` [enrich debug] stdout: ${trunc(output.stdout.trim(), maxLog)}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:167 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Sensitive files are automatically filtered out during export (`.credentials`, `.env`, `.secret`, `.key`, `.pem`).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:78 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files| `<skill-dir>/skills/.credentials` | write (optional) | Written when install is run with `--api-key` |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsagentar_cli.mjs:1135 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif (opts.apiKey) console.log(` credentials: ${workspace}/skills/.credentials`);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:110 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…excluded by default. Output defaults to `~/agentar-exports/`. Sensitive files (`.credentials`, `.env`, `.secret`, `.key`, `.pem`) are automatically filtered out. **Options…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:102 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `--api-key <key>` — (Optional) API key to save into `skills/.credentials` for agentars that require backend authentication.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsagentar_cli.mjs:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst SENSITIVE_PATTERNS = [".credentials", ".env", ".secret", ".key", ".pem"];Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionagentar_cli.mjs:740 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(" Warning: no JSON found in openclaw output, falling back to SOUL.md");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionagentar_cli.mjs:706 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif (output.stderr) console.log(` [enrich debug] stderr: ${trunc(output.stderr.trim(), maxLog)}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsagentar_cli.mjs:308 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfs.writeFileSync(path.join(skillsDir, ".credentials"), `apiKey=${apiKey}\n`);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedagentar_cli.mjs:361 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads…icode mapping for bytes 128-255 (ZIP spec default encoding) const CP437_HIGH = "\u00C7\u00FC\u00E9\u00E2\u00E4\u00E0\u00E5\u00E7\u00EA\u00EB\u00E8\u00EF\u00EE\u00EC\u00C4\u00C5\u00C9\u00E6\u00C6\u00F4\u00F6\u00F2\u00FB\u00F9\u00FF\u00D6\u0…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionagentar_cli.mjs:704 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` [enrich debug] status=${output.status}, stdout length=${(output.stdout || "").length}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionagentar_cli.mjs:1046 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` output: ${resolved}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,208 tok
1 file · 3 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim lovelcp: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  4. Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
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