cast@0.1.1

BLOCKED· install only

Publisher claims: "Skill for managing EVM wallets, transactions, and network helpers via cast; covers onboarding, checks, and operating procedures." Observed in sandbox: sends data to foundry.paradigm.xyz.

Registry ClawHubPublisher tezatezaz · publishing for 291 daysInstalls 2,647Last detonated 4 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 11 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 41/100 (Blocked). Do not install it: the sandbox observed behaviour consistent with credential theft, exfiltration or persistence. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Privileged sudo command. Summary: sends data to foundry.paradigm.xyz.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sfilesystemwrote ~/.agent-wallet/state.env
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://foundry.paradigm.xyz:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexited 56: curl: (56) CONNECT tunnel failed, response 403
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sfilesystemread ~/.agent-wallet/state.env outside project
0.4sfilesystemwrote ~/.agent-wallet/state.env
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/sed
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/grep
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.5sfilesystemread ~/.agent-wallet/state.env outside project
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/tr
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sfilesystemread ~/.agent-wallet/state.env outside project
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.5sprocessexited 1:
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.6sfilesystemread ~/.agent-wallet/state.env outside project
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.6sprocessexited 1:
0.6sprocess8 of 11 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/run.sh:4 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "${DIR}/"*.sh || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/01_install_cast.sh:19 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/00_lib.sh:93 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 700 "${APP_DIR}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/01_install_cast.sh:19 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/02_wallet.sh:196 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "${PK_TMP}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/03_password.sh:73 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "${KEYSTORE_FILE}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsscripts/03_password.sh:43 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringdim "If cast prompts you, enter the password you just set."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/00_lib.sh:158 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$target" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/03_password.sh:33 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "${PASSWORD_FILE}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/00_lib.sh:140 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "${STATE_FILE}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/00_lib.sh:130 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "${STATE_FILE}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/02_wallet.sh:183 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "${MNEMONIC_FILE}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/00_lib.sh:103 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "${STATE_FILE}" || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/02_wallet.sh:57 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesif ! sudo sh -c "$installer > /tmp/at-install.log 2>&1"; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,899 tok
1 file · 16 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

39 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.agent-wallet/state.env, ~/.agent-wallet/state.env.
  2. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  3. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim tezatezaz: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  6. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim tezatezazPropose a patch to the maintainer