cargo@1.37.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Entry point for Cargo (getcargo.ai), go-to-market infrastructure for AI agents. With Cargo an agent builds B2B lead lists, finds and verifies work emails, enriches companies and contacts, qualifies leads, syncs the CRM and watches buying signals, then runs any of it on a schedule. New accounts get 100 free credits, no card. Routes each job to the right Cargo skill and holds the rules that apply across all of them (project vs one-off CLI, run vs batch, async polling, silent-failure gotchas). Triggers: "set up Cargo", "what can Cargo do", "what is Cargo", "which Cargo skill", "bootstrap my workspace", "I have a Cargo account", "cargo-ai …", any `cargo-ai` command whose domain is unclear, or a task spanning two Cargo domains. Skip when: the task obviously belongs to one skill; load that skill directly." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher cargo-ai · publishing for 258 daysInstalls 4,423Last detonated 22 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

What changed since 1.36.5

vet-skills diff cargo 1.36.5 1.37.0

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.36.5 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

1.37.0 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Authorization escalation language; Authorization escalation language. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:293 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code…e failure. It also lists `skills-missing` when no agent skills are found (fix: `npx skills add getcargohq/cargo-skills`) without changing the exit code; the plugin instal…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationSKILL.md:114 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime…rges automatically. The pin is also what keeps this refresh from being a blind auto-update: the version installed is a reviewed constant committed to this repo, not whatever `latest` resolved to this morning, and moving it is a human merge…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:681 · Authorization escalation language- Most commands require a token with **admin access**.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:106 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y skills add getcargohq/cargo-skillsFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:76 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files… `--agentid` all save a self-renewing session to `~/.config/cargo-ai/credentials.json` (the system temp dir where home isn't writable — it lasts as long as the sandbox). Use `--token` for CI, with a workspace-scoped token from **Settings >…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Authorization escalation languagereferences/prerequisites.md:52 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileSome domains require a token with **admin access** on the workspace:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:78 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeWithout a global install, prefix every command with `npx @cargo-ai/cli` instead of `cargo-ai`.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageSKILL.md:472 · Authorization escalation language- Requires a token with **admin access**.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:88 · Remote installer piped to shell> **Installing Cargo is the user's call, not an action you take.** The `curl … install.sh | sh`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:661 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code`npx skills add getcargohq/gtm-skills/<name>`. See the section inFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:88 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code> **Installing Cargo is the user's call, not an action you take.** The `curl … install.sh | sh`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈18,277 tok
1 file · 10 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cargo-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  3. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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