cargo-project@5.0.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Manages a whole Cargo workspace as code, like Terraform: connectors, models, plays, tools, agents, MCP servers, segments, context, files, workers and apps declared in TypeScript, previewed with `cargo-ai project plan`, applied with `deploy`, and reviewed in a PR. Triggers: "as code", "in git", "version-controlled", "reproducible", "Terraform for Cargo", "set up a whole workspace", "staging and production", "deploy the workspace from CI", "review this in a PR", "cargo.json", "cargo.state.json", "scaffold from a template", "is there a cookbook for this", "start from a cookbook". Skills with a worked project example (TAM building, account scoring, call capture, inbound qualification, CRM enrichment, standup) live in gtm-skills; menu in references/cookbooks.md. Skip when: it is a one-off operation, a read, or an ad-hoc query; use the matching capability skill." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
What changed since 4.4.1
vet-skills diff cargo-project 4.4.1 5.0.0In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 4.4.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
5.0.0 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
made (Windows without developer mode) it is a copy, and the handoff brief says so; then editFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.made (Windows without developer mode) it is a copy, and the handoff brief says so; then editFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.npm install -g @cargo-ai/cli # no global install? prefix every command with `npx @cargo-ai/cli`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.**If you are mid-task and the skill is not in this session**, `npx skills addFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.installing, `npx skills use getcargohq/gtm-skills@<slug>` prints it. Neither brings theFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cargo-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.