Skills/ClawHub/cargo-hosting

cargo-hosting@1.2.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Put something on the internet from Cargo — hosted web apps (Vite by default, other static frameworks detected) and serverless edge workers that answer HTTP requests, plus the deployments that build and promote them, the env vars and secrets a worker reads, running a worker locally, and custom domains and search indexing for public sites. Triggers: "build me a dashboard for this", "host this app", "give me a URL to share", "deploy this", "I need a webhook endpoint", "make it live", "promote to production", "ship a UI for my team", "give my worker an API token", "set a secret on the worker", "Missing CARGO_API_TOKEN", "my app cannot call my worker", "run the worker locally", "put it on my own domain", "make the site indexable by Google". Skip when: the app or worker should be declared as committed workspace code — use cargo-project." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher cargo-ai · joined 5 days agoInstalls 1,228Last detonated 9 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-10-27 and scored it 59/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:142 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:40 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:58 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:86 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

What would make this Verified

21 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cargo-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
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