Skills/ClawHub/cargo-gtm

cargo-gtm@2.3.2

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Do business-to-business go-to-market work on Cargo — research accounts and buying committees, enrich and verify B2B contact records from licensed data providers, score and qualify leads, draft permission-based outreach for the user's own sequencer, sync to CRM, and monitor buying signals. Consent basis, suppression lists, and volume limits gate every step that touches a person (`references/acceptable-use.md`); bulk unsolicited messaging, purchased or scraped lists, and consumer targeting are refused. Triggers: "build me a list of", "find 50 <title> at <segment>", "who works at", "find work emails for these accounts", "enrich this CSV", "verify these emails", "build a TAM", "who fits our ICP", "who actually buys from us", "what data points should we collect on accounts", "our outbound is reaching the wrong people", "score these leads", "write a first-touch email", "push these to my CRM", "who changed jobs", "who just raised funding", "companies using <tech>", "who is hiring <role>", "find the buying committee", "portfolio companies of <investor>", "upload this audience to Google/Meta/LinkedIn ads". Providers: aiArk, anthropic, apolloio, bouncer, brightData, builtwith, cleon1, companyEnrich, contactOut, datagma, dropcontact, enrichCrm, enrichley, enrowio, exa, findyMail, firecrawl, forager, FullEnrich, g2, gemini, hunter, icypeas, kitt, leadMagic, linkedin, linkup, mixrank, neverBounce, oceanio, openAi, parallel, peopleDataLabs, perplexity, piloterr, prospeo, proxycurl, reverseContact, rocketreach, salesNavigator, serper, sillage, snitcher, societeInfo, theirStack, theSwarm, waterfall, x, zeroBounce. Reads phase guides, recipes, and per-provider playbooks before any paid call. Skip when: a run already happened and misbehaved — use cargo-diagnostics." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher cargo-ai · joined 11 days agoInstalls 3,031Last detonated 2 h ago
$clawhub install cargo-gtm
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Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-11-03 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/contact-accuracy-audit.ts:24 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:39 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/validate-linkedin-names.ts:8 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/select-current-role.ts:11 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07