cargo-billing@2.1.4
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Reports what Cargo is costing: remaining credits, usage by workflow, connector or agent, the plan, and invoices. New accounts start with 100 free credits, no card. Triggers: "how many credits do I have left", "what did that cost", "why is my bill so high", "am I about to run out", "will this fit in our budget", "show me my invoices", "how much have I spent this month", "what plan am I on", "what do I get for free", "how many free credits", "can I afford this run", "add a card", "update my payment method", "why was my card declined". Needs a token with admin access. Skip when: attributing spend to specific nodes or cutting a play cost, use cargo-diagnostics." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-04 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Authorization escalation language; Authorization escalation language; Authorization escalation language. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
What would make this Verified
14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cargo-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.