call-capture@0.2.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Turn your recorded calls into a go-to-market knowledge base: each recorded call is collected every morning, scribed into a log entry, and, once a claim repeats, promoted into context, as one pull request against your go-to-market repo. Nine recorders ship; a tenth is one adapter file. Triggers: "our call recordings never make it into the knowledge base", "turn our call transcripts into context", "we relearn the same objection every quarter", "scribe yesterday's calls into the repo every morning", "replace the GitHub Action that summarizes our meetings", "we record on Granola, not Avoma". Cargo project, defineAgent, harnessSlug claudeCode, workspace env var, GitHub, Avoma, Granola, Fathom, Gong, Fireflies, Grain, tl;dv, Modjo, Clari Copilot, cadence, context. Skip when: you want one call summarized right now, which is a read against the recorder's own API and needs nothing deployed." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
What changed since 0.1.3
vet-skills diff call-capture 0.1.3 0.2.0This version reaches for something 0.1.3 did not: 9 new hosts (avoma.com, clari.com, fathom.ai, fireflies.ai, …) · 1 new credential variable (CALL_RECORDER_API_KEY). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New hosts
- avoma.com, clari.com, fathom.ai, fireflies.ai, gong.io, grain.com, granola.ai, modjo.ai, tldv.io
- New credential variables
- CALL_RECORDER_API_KEY
0.2.0 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
singleton, which is why this folder ships none. **Append nothing to `.env.example`:** thisFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.deploying machine's value, so the key has to be in a shell or a `.env` for every deploy, byFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…leave `state` unset and deploy binds the project's connected state (`cargo.state.json`): its repository, directory and production branch. `cargo-ai project check` prints the binding; a project whose state is not connected deploys the agent…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.**Workspace Access Tokens** read *all* workspace data, require admin access, and are **BusinessFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cargo-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.