buzz-acp@0.2.1
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Deploy and manage AI agents (OpenClaw, Claude Code) as first-class participants in a self-hosted Buzz workspace via ACP." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
sudo cp systemd/buzz-marvin.service /etc/systemd/system/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.buzz-admin generate-key # relay signing key → BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEY in .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Key `.env` settings:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.cp .env.example .env # edit passwords for productionFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.sudo cp systemd/buzz-relay.service /etc/systemd/system/Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo systemctl daemon-reloadFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sudo systemctl daemon-reload && sudo systemctl enable --now buzz-relayFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- Windows: `Buzz_x.x.xx_x64-setup_alpha-unsigned.exe` — **not code-signed.** Only download it from the [official releases page](https://github.com/block/buzz/releases/latest) over HTTPS; checksum/signFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Export the key explicitly — having it in `.env` isn't enough when running buzz-admin manually.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- README tells the reader to bypass SmartScreen≈ +9 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim darrenjrobinson: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.