Skills/ClawHub/browser-secure

browser-secure@2.0.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Secure browser automation with Chrome profile support, vault integration, approval gates, and comprehensive audit logging. Use for authenticated sites, sensi..." Observed in sandbox: calls registry.npmjs.org only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher riverho · publishing for 211 daysInstalls 2,066Last detonated 7 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collects environment variables by secret-like names; Fake instruction boundary tag; Fake instruction boundary tag. Summary: calls registry.npmjs.org only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 4 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
3.4snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
3.4snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
3.4snetworkCONNECT tcp://registry.npmjs.org:443
3.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/which
3.4sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/npx
3.4sprocessexec /tmp/ks-detonate-MVZule/scripts/home/.npm/_npx/e41f203b7505f1fb/node_modules/.bin/playwright
3.4sprocessexited 1: (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created)
3.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
3.5sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
3.5sprocess2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments
3.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
3.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
3.5sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Collects environment variables by secret-like namesdist/config/loader.js:102 · Collects environment variables by secret-like namesconst hasEnvCreds = Object.keys(process.env).some(k => k.startsWith('BROWSER_SECURE_') && (k.endsWith('_USERNAME') || k.endsWith('_PASSWORD') || k.endsWith('_TOKEN')));Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagSKILL.md:430 · Fake instruction boundary tag| `act "<instruction>"` | Natural language action |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagSKILL.md:431 · Fake instruction boundary tag| `extract "<instruction>"` | Extract data from page |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Collects environment variables by secret-like namesdist/security/approval.js:72 · Collects environment variables by secret-like namesconst hasEnvCreds = Object.keys(process.env).some(k => k.startsWith('BROWSER_SECURE_') && (k.endsWith('_USERNAME') || k.endsWith('_PASSWORD') || k.endsWith('_TOKEN')));Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/onboarding.js:110 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconst result = execSync('npx playwright --version', {Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/vault/index.js:143 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'For full automation, set BW_PASSWORD or BW_SESSION in your .env file.');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/cli.ts:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst defaultEnvPath = path.resolve(skillRoot, '..', '.env');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/cli.ts:740 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif (playbook.discovery.search_input_selector) console.log(` Search input: ${playbook.discovery.search_input_selector}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:318 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files> The `.env` file lives in the **parent skills/ directory** (one level aboveFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:313 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files#### Option B: .env File (Automation, Trusted Hosts Only)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collects environment variables by secret-like namessrc/config/loader.ts:176 · Collects environment variables by secret-like namesconst hasEnvCreds = Object.keys(process.env).some(k =>Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
LOW
HTML that renders invisible but is read by the agentassets/welcome.html:445 · HTML that renders invisible but is read by the agent · informational: not an instruction file🔒 Never trust, always verify, encrypt everything, audit all actionsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tagREADME.md:151 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file| `browser-secure act "<instruction>"` | Natural language action (legacy) |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/onboarding.js:121 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeinstallCmd: () => 'npx playwright install chromium'Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/browser/chrome-lifecycle.ts:74 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions} catch { /* ignore on platforms where chmod is limited */ }Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"BW_CLIENTID": "Bitwarden API key ID (for automation - stored in .env only on trusted machines)",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collects environment variables by secret-like namessrc/security/approval.ts:113 · Collects environment variables by secret-like namesconst hasEnvCreds = Object.keys(process.env).some(k =>Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/browser/chrome-lifecycle.js:71 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionscatch { /* ignore on platforms where chmod is limited */ }Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesetup.json:27 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"installCmd": "npx playwright install chromium"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst defaultEnvPath = path.resolve(skillRoot, '..', '.env');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:320 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files> the skill's source tree. Override with `BROWSER_SECURE_ENV=/path/.env`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.js:659 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` Search input: ${playbook.discovery.search_input_selector}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/cli.ts:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load .env from the parent skills/ directory — kept outside this skill'sFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/vault/index.ts:166 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files'For full automation, set BW_PASSWORD or BW_SESSION in your .env file.'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"BW_CLIENTSECRET": "Bitwarden API key secret (for automation - stored in .env only on trusted machines)",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:325 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 .envFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:324 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp .env.example .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:369 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 .envFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:315 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files> ⚠️ **Security Note:** `.env` stores credentials in plaintext. Only use thisFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load .env from the parent skills/ directory — kept outside this skill'sFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,880 tok
1 file · 63 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim riverho: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Collects environment variables by secret-like names≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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