Skills/ClawHub/browser-control

browser-control@1.0.3

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Remote browser access for login, 2FA, captcha, and manual verification. Protected by Google OAuth - only the configured email can access. Use when you need t..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher felipegoulu · publishing for 273 daysInstalls 1,781Last detonated 23 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 61/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Tunneling service URL; Tunneling service URL; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sfilesystemwrote ~/.openclaw/skills/browser-control/vnc-password
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/openssl
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.1sprocessexited 127: ./install.sh: line 63: sudo: command not found
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sfilesystemread ~/.openclaw/skills/browser-control/vnc-password outside project
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocess4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2sfilesystemwrote ~/.openclaw/skills/browser-control/vnc-password
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/openssl
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/chmod
0.2sprocessexited 127: ./install.sh: line 63: sudo: command not found

Static findings

HIGH
Tunneling service URLSKILL.md:61 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructure"novncUrl": "https://xxx.ngrok.app/vnc.html?password=xxx&autoconnect=true",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Tunneling service URLSKILL.md:21 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructure2. Ask for your **ngrok authtoken** (get it from https://dashboard.ngrok.com/get-started/your-authtoken)Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:81 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files**Important:** The tunnel URL changes frequently. Always `cat config.json` right before sending the link.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLinstall.sh:109 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourceecho ' /bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)"'Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Tunneling service URLinstall.sh:189 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructureecho " Go to: https://dashboard.ngrok.com/get-started/your-authtoken"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:68 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install -y chromium-browser || sudo apt-get install -y chromiumFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:54 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 $SKILL_DIR/vnc-passwordFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:94 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x ~/.vnc/xstartupFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:63 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Tunneling service URLSKILL.md:88 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructureOpen: https://xxx.ngrok.app/vnc.html?password=xxx&autoconnect=trueFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Tunneling service URLSKILL.md:62 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructure"tunnelUrl": "https://xxx.ngrok.app",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:83 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 ~/.vnc/passwdFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Tunneling service URLinstall.sh:180 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructureecho " 👉 https://dashboard.ngrok.com/get-started/your-authtoken"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:157 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x $SKILL_DIR/start-chrome.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:64 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install -y tightvncserver xfce4 xfce4-terminal xterm novnc websockify curl jqFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandinstall.sh:73 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegescurl -s https://ngrok-agent.s3.amazonaws.com/ngrok.asc | sudo tee /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/ngrok.asc >/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:127 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files├── config.json # Current URL (read this before sending to user!)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandinstall.sh:382 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesvncserver -kill :1 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstart-tunnel.sh:54 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesvncserver -kill :1 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandinstall.sh:428 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif ! kill -0 $WEBSOCKIFY_PID 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandinstall.sh:547 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesvncserver -kill :1 2>/dev/null && echo " ✓ VNC stopped" || echo " - VNC not running"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstart-tunnel.sh:100 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif ! kill -0 $WEBSOCKIFY_PID 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstop-tunnel.sh:8 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesvncserver -kill :1 2>/dev/null && echo " ✓ VNC stopped" || echo " - VNC not running"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:317 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 "$SKILL_DIR/ngrok-config.json"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈898 tok
1 file · 6 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

19 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim felipegoulu: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  3. Tunneling service URL≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  4. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim felipegouluPropose a patch to the maintainer