Skills/ClawHub/braindb

braindb@0.5.2

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Persistent, semantic memory for AI agents. Gives your AI long-term recall that survives compaction and session resets — 98% accuracy, 20ms latency." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher chair4ce · publishing for 279 daysInstalls 2,394Last detonated 11 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.0sprocessexited 1:
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.1sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'sentence_transformers'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.8sfilesystemread ~/ldaprc · ~/.ldaprc outside project
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:3333 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.8sprocessexec /usr/bin/which
0.8sprocessexec /usr/bin/head
0.8sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/npm
0.8sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.8sprocessexec /usr/bin/git
0.8sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.8sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.9sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.9sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
1.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
1.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
1.0sprocessexited 1:
1.0sprocess6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments
1.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
1.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
1.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
1.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
1.1sprocessexited 1:
1.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
1.1sprocessexited 1:

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [ ! -f .env ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessed "s/CHANGE_ME/$RANDOM_PASS/" .env.example > .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Create .env with secure random password if missingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionmigrate.cjs:616 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('🐝 Using Gemini Flash extraction (⚠️ sends data to Google API)');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesNEO4J_AUTH: "${NEO4J_USER:-neo4j}/${NEO4J_PASSWORD:?Set NEO4J_PASSWORD in .env}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiongateway.js:1485 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`🔮 Speculative recall: ${warmed} full recalls pre-computed, ${skipped} already cached (${recallCache.size} total)`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall.sh:224 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code…cho "" echo " Gateway: http://localhost:$BRAINDB_PORT" echo " Memories: $(curl -sf http://localhost:$BRAINDB_PORT/health 2>/dev/null | node -e "let d='';process.stdin.on('data',c=>d+=c);process.stdin.on('end',()=>{try{c…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:115 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Writes `.env` with generated Neo4j credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall.sh:185 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeMEMORY_COUNT=$(curl -sf "http://localhost:$BRAINDB_PORT/health" 2>/dev/null | node -e "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:60 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesNEO4J_PASSWORD: "${NEO4J_PASSWORD:?Set NEO4J_PASSWORD in .env}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionmigrate.cjs:696 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` curl -s -X POST ${BRAINDB_URL}/memory/recall \\`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsinstall.sh:94 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [ ! -f .env ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternuninstall.sh:38 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeMEMORY_COUNT=$(curl -sf "http://localhost:$BRAINDB_PORT/health" | node -e "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "📋 Created .env with auto-generated Neo4j password"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsinstall.sh:96 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessed "s/CHANGE_ME/$RANDOM_PASS/" .env.example > .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsinstall.sh:93 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Create .env with secure random password if missingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,541 tok
1 file · 14 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim chair4ce: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim chair4cePropose a patch to the maintainer