Skills/ClawHub/botlearn-doctor

botlearn-doctor@1.0.2

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Autonomously inspects a live OpenClaw instance across 5 health domains (hardware, config, security, skills, autonomy) and delivers a quantified traffic-light..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher calvinxhk · publishing for 259 daysInstalls 1,212Last detonated 15 min ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 62/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:233 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files| Secrets tracked in VCS | `vcs` | clean | .env without .gitignore | tracked in git | -10 / -25 |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/collect-security.sh:88 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Also scan .env files in OPENCLAW_HOMEFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/collect-security.sh:84 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files...scanDir(HOME + "/config", [".json", ".yaml", ".yml", ".toml", ".env", "*"]),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:250 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsPermissions: [all OK / X files need chmod 600]Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/collect-security.sh:89 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst envFile = HOME + "/.env";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/collect-security.sh:103 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesHOME + "/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/collect-security.sh:239 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst shouldIgnore = [".env", "*.key", "*.pem", "config/*.secret", "credentials"];Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/generate-report.sh:5 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files# generate-report.sh --input <analysis.json> --format md|html|all [--output-dir <dir>]Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/generate-report.sh:27 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesecho "Usage: generate-report.sh --input <analysis.json> --format md|html|all [--output-dir <dir>]" >&2Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/score-calculator.sh:425 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(output, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈5,258 tok
1 file · 26 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

18 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim calvinxhk: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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