book-video-generator-2-6-0@2.6.0
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "三分钟精读一本书视频生成器。输入书名+作者，一键生成3分钟读书解说视频（书评文案→AI插图→TTS配音→字幕→最终合成MP4）。触发词：三分钟精读书、生成读书视频、精读一本书、book video、做读书视频、书评视频。跨平台兼容 WorkBuddy / OpenClaw / Codex CLI / TRAE Work。" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 52/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyt+CategoryObserved action
This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedscripts/generate_audio.py:214 · OS command execution function call detected
AST05os.system(f"{sys.executable} -m pip install edge-tts -q")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/compose_video.py:725 · Python subprocess execution detected
AST05subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/compose_video.py:88 · Python subprocess execution detected
AST05result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/generate_audio.py:20 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files
AST07python generate_audio.py --batch captions.json --output-dir audio/Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:202 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files
AST07python3 scripts/generate_audio.py --batch captions.json --output-dir audio/ --voice "zh_female_zhixingnv_uranus_bigtts"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/compose_video.py:140 · Python subprocess execution detected
AST05r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/compose_video.py:689 · Python subprocess execution detected
AST05subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.MEDIUM
Dense URL-encoded contentreferences/workflow-original.yaml:942 · Dense URL-encoded content — may be obfuscating payloads
AST07value: "https://codel-agent.oss-cn-shanghai.aliyuncs.com/RW%20%E7%AE%80%E5%8D%95%E7%9A%84%E8%83%8C%E6%99%AF%E9%9F%B3%E4%B9%90%20-%20%E8%AF%BB%E4%B9%A6%E8%83%8C%E6%99%AF%E9%9F%B3%E4%B9%90.mp3"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedscripts/generate_image.py:114 · OS command execution function call detected
AST05os.system(f"{sys.executable} -m pip install volcenginesdkcore volcenginesdkvisualapi -q")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/compose_video.py:702 · Python subprocess execution detected
AST05subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/generate_image.py:17 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files
AST07python3 generate_image.py --batch storyboard.json --output-dir images/Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Instructions loaded
≈2,471 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
28 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim chenjun198711: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Dense URL-encoded content≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim chenjun198711Propose a patch to the maintainer