Skills/ClawHub/basecamp-cli-mcp

basecamp-cli-mcp@2.0.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "CLI and MCP server for Basecamp 4. Use when you need to interact with Basecamp projects, todos, messages, schedules, kanban cards, documents, or campfires. Provides 76 MCP tools for AI-driven project management workflows." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher drkraft · publishing for 289 daysInstalls 3,217Last detonated 54 min ago
$clawhub install basecamp-cli-mcp
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.0sprocessexited 127: ./scripts/release.sh: line 21: bun: command not found
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.2sprocess3 of 3 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/lib/api.ts:583 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files}).json<BasecampUpload>();Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/__tests__/setup.ts:31 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials// Mock auth module to bypass token validation in API testsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/lib/api.ts:568 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files}).json<BasecampUpload>();Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/commands/uploads.ts:42 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(uploadsList, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/commands/uploads.ts:101 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(JSON.stringify(upload, null, 2));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/commands/uploads.ts:47 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(chalk.yellow('No uploads found.'));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsSKILL.md:5 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking…anagement workflows. mcp: true metadata: {"openclaw":{"emoji":"🏕️","homepage":"https://github.com/drkraft/basecamp-cli","primaryEnv":"BASECAMP_CLIENT_SECRET","requires":{"bins":["basecamp-mcp"],"env":["BASECAMP_CLIENT_ID","BASECAMP_CLIENT…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/commands/uploads.ts:69 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(chalk.dim(`\nTotal: ${uploadsList.length} uploads`));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/commands/uploads.ts:105 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(chalk.bold(upload.title));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/lib/api.ts:548 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst response = await client.get(`buckets/${projectId}/uploads/${uploadId}.json`).json<BasecampUpload>();Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/commands/vaults.ts:111 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(chalk.dim(`Uploads: ${vault.uploads_count}`));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,295 tok
1 file · 61 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.