Skills/ClawHub/baidu-netdisk-skills

baidu-netdisk-skills@1.1.5

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "百度网盘(Baidu Drive, pan.baidu.com)文件管理 — 上传、下载、转存、分享、搜索、移动、复制、重命名、创建文件夹、删除（高风险，需用户确认）。 同时支持 Agent 记忆备份/恢复（kimiclaw/maxclaw/qclaw/openclaw）。 TRIGGER: 用户消息明确提及"百..." Observed in sandbox: sends data to issuecdn.baidupcs.com.

Registry ClawHubPublisher wscats · publishing for 169 daysInstalls 23,329Last detonated 1 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 64/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected. Summary: sends data to issuecdn.baidupcs.com.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://issuecdn.baidupcs.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexited 22: curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 403
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.3snetworkCONNECT tcp://issuecdn.baidupcs.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.3sprocessexited 22: curl: (22) The requested URL returned error: 403

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/install.sh:195 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x "${installer_name}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandSKILL.md:155 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -0 <PID> 2>/dev/null && echo "running" || echo "done"; ls -l <本地路径> 2>/dev/null; tail -5 /tmp/bdpan-dl-<PID>.log 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:160 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/bdpan-dl-<PID>.logFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,100 tok
1 file · 13 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

16 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim wscats: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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