awesome-poetize-open-blog-automation@2.5.1
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "让 AI 帮你运营 POETIZE 博客：写文章、发布、删除进回收站与恢复、管理分类标签、切换主题、查看数据、配置 SEO、处理付费文章支付配置；含认证持久化、配置生成、测试等辅助能力。仅支持 awesome-poetize-open（POETIZE 的开源 fork），不适用于闭源版 POETIZE 或其他博客系统，也不用于与 POETIZE 无关的通用写作或 SEO 咨询。开源仓库：https://github.com/LeapYa/awesome-poetize-open" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-29 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/render_openclaw_config.py:100 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:58 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/render_openclaw_config.py:98 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05