awesome-geelark-skill@1.0.1
CAUTION· static onlyPublisher claims: "Interact with GeeLark Cloud Phone API for managing cloud phones, automation tasks, and social media operations. Use when asked to create cloud phones, manage..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Coverage
Static only; nothing was run yet.The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 56/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Credential pass-through configuration; Privileged sudo command. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.
Behavior trace
Queued for honeypot run · static analysis onlyThis version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.
Static findings
result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sudo apt update && sudo apt install adbFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.7. **Credential Safety**: Never print or log full API tokens, passwords, or proxy credentials. Use masked versions (e.g., `tok_abc...xyz`) in outputs.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose." Ubuntu: sudo apt install adb\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- Swipe coordinates: `subprocess.run(['adb', '-s', 'device', 'shell', 'input', 'swipe', x1, y1, x2, y2])`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.### Enable Debug ModeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.> - Set restrictive permissions: `chmod 600 assets/config.json`Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.- Click coordinates: `d.click(x, y)` or `subprocess.run(['adb', '-s', 'device', 'shell', 'input', 'tap', x, y])`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(['adb', '-s', f"{adb_info['ip']}:{adb_info['port']}",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod 600 assets/config.jsonFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts." 3. Check file permissions: chmod 600 assets/config.json",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.run(['adb', '-s', f"{adb_info['ip']}:{adb_info['port']}",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.### 1. Enable Debug ModeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.d.debug = True # Enable debug mode to see HTTP request/response detailsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.# Enable debug modeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.subprocess.run(['adb', '-s', f"{adb_info['ip']}:{adb_info['port']}",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.### Enable Debug ModeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
24 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim geelarkbot: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.