Skills/ClawHub/automatic-skill

automatic-skill@1.4.1

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "每日 Skill 自动工厂 — 让 openclaw 和 Claude 完全自主地调研、设计、生成、测试并发布全新 skill,全程零人工介入。内置 10 阶段流水线(Research → Design → SEO → Create → Review → Self-Run → Self-Check → Uploa..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher cosmofang · publishing for 224 daysInstalls 1,011Last detonated 4 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/design.js:113 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges- Privilege level (runs as current user, no sudo needed)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/upload.js:203 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesOUTPUT FORMAT (write to data/current-pipeline.json under "upload" key)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandSKILL.md:200 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges- 运行时以当前用户身份执行,不需要 sudo 或提权Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/verify-upload.js:132 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesOUTPUT FORMAT (write to data/current-pipeline.json under "verifyUpload" key)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:52 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code- name: npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/upload.js:62 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`=== AUTOMATIC SKILL — Stage 8: Upload ===Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/verify-upload.js:245 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files输出格式(写入 data/current-pipeline.json 的 "verifyUpload" 键)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/upload.js:375 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files输出格式(写入 data/current-pipeline.json 的 "upload" 键)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/verify-upload.js:66 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`=== AUTOMATIC SKILL — Stage 9: Verify Upload ===Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/create.js:88 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files4. Scripts: each script must be a standalone Node.js file. It must print a prompt (console.log) that tells the agent exactly what to do. Include input validation and helpful error messages.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,072 tok
1 file · 21 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cosmofang: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim cosmofangPropose a patch to the maintainer