autofix@6.1.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "A comprehensive, self-evolving skill designed to diagnose and solve OpenClaw issues by following a structured, multi-stage resolution cycle. It incorporates..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
| 🔐 Hot-Reload Config | Monitors `openclaw.json` changes and reloads automatically |Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.return f"sudo {base_command}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(['taskkill', '/F', '/PID', str(pid)],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.analysis["fix_command"] = "sudo openclaw doctor --fix --pty=true"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=JetBrains+Mono:wght@400;700&display=swap');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- ✅ Hot-reload config — Watches `openclaw.json` for changesFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.subprocess.run(cmd, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(cmd, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."可能需要使用 sudo 或以 root 身份运行"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.r = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mikewongonline: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.