Skills/ClawHub/autoclip-pro

autoclip-pro@1.0.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "视频批量处理技能包 - 一键处理100个视频,自动剪辑、加字幕、配乐、调风格。适合自媒体从业者、短视频创作者。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher gdp6539 · publishing for 260 daysInstalls 1,716Last detonated 1 h ago
$clawhub install autoclip-pro
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · 2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 92/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocess2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/batch-process.js:136 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` ⏭️ 跳过 (已存在): ${outputName}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/batch-process.js:212 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` ✅ 完成: ${outputName}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/batch-process.js:248 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` 请将视频放入 ${path.resolve(__dirname, '..', this.config.inputDir)} 文件夹`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈312 tok
1 file · 14 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.