Skills/ClawHub/auto-pr-merger

auto-pr-merger@1.0.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Automatically checks out a GitHub PR, runs tests, retries fixes if tests fail, and merges the PR upon successful tests." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher autogame-17 · publishing for 275 daysInstalls 2,134Last detonated 29 min ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsindex.js:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Try to load from .env in workspace rootFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionindex.js:287 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(outputTail);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionindex.js:313 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("Nothing to commit (LLM output matched existing file?) or error.");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionindex.js:319 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("Could not identify failing file from output. Cannot apply AI fix.");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionindex.js:285 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log('--- Test Output (Tail) ---');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsindex.js:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespath.resolve(process.cwd(), '..', '.env'),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsindex.js:68 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconsole.warn("GEMINI_API_KEY not found in environment or .env files.");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsindex.js:43 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespath.resolve(__dirname, '../../..', '.env')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsindex.js:41 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespath.resolve(process.cwd(), '.env'),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈247 tok
1 file · 4 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim autogame-17: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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