Skills/ClawHub/auto-midjourney

auto-midjourney@0.1.2

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Automate Midjourney Alpha web image generation from Claude using the authenticated https://alpha.midjourney.com session. Use this skill whenever the user wan..." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry ClawHubPublisher standed · publishing for 239 daysInstalls 1,050Last detonated 24 min ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 58/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/mj_doctor.py:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesparser.add_argument("--dotenv", default=".env", help="Path to .env file")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mj_browser.py:191 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(command, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/run_imagine.py:46 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesparser.add_argument("--dotenv", default=".env", help="Path to .env file")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:280 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filespython3 scripts/convert_downloads.py outputs/live-test/recent-job.json --output-dir outputs/png-rebuiltFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/poll_job.py:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesparser.add_argument("--dotenv", default=".env", help="Path to .env file")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/list_recent_jobs.py:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesparser.add_argument("--dotenv", default=".env", help="Path to .env file")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionSKILL.md:290 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filespython3 scripts/batch_generate.py prompts.txt --transport browser --sync-user-state --download-dir outputs/batchFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagSKILL.md:332 · Fake instruction boundary tag3. `python3 scripts/run_imagine.py "<prompt>" --transport browser --sync-user-state --wait-page-assets --download`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mj_browser.py:98 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:87 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesRead these values from `.env` or shell environment:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagSKILL.md:331 · Fake instruction boundary tag2. `python3 scripts/run_imagine.py "<prompt>" --transport browser --sync-user-state`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/get_user_state.py:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesparser.add_argument("--dotenv", default=".env", help="Path to .env file")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/mj_alpha.py:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespath = Path(dotenv_path or ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/batch_generate.py:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesparser.add_argument("--dotenv", default=".env", help="Path to .env file")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/submit_job.py:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesparser.add_argument("--dotenv", default=".env", help="Path to .env file")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mj_browser.py:109 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files4. Safe local configuration via `.env`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mj_alpha.py:268 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mj_browser.py:304 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(command, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tagreferences/operating-model.md:12 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file6. Use `python3 scripts/run_imagine.py "<prompt>" --sync-user-state --wait-page-assets --download --convert-to png` when you need a verified local resultFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mj_browser.py:252 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(command, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tagreferences/operating-model.md:10 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file4. Submit one prompt with `python3 scripts/run_imagine.py "<prompt>" --sync-user-state`Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,262 tok
1 file · 31 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

22 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim standed: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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